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RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON TERRORISM
Harvey Rishikoft and Bernard Horowitztt
1. TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?
I. Introduction: 11/9-9/11 and the three-tiered chessboard of power
The key to understanding 9/11 is to situate the War on
Terrorism within the transformation from the Cold War paradigm
to a new framework for projecting force and defining national
interests. These developments are being played out on a three-
tiered chessboard-one board features military power, a second
international norms (treaties/diplomacy), and the third economic
interests. The three boards are wired together by the rule of law
and social forces, and upheaval on any of the three boards can
affect the others. The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks
combined to substantially disrupt the board on all three levels.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall ("11/9"), the United States, as
guarantor of the system, has been trying to maintain an evolving
t The views expressed in this article are those of the author (Harvey
Rishikof) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence or the Office of the National Counterintelligence
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stability by striking a new balance on each level of the board.
II. Cold War Paradigm: Division of labor between the United States and
the USSR
During the Cold War era, failed states were limited by the two-
power system-the United States strove for "full spectrum
dominance" and nuclear deterrence checked superpower
responses. Unrest in areas on the boundaries of the USSR was
repressed (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia) under a neosphere of
influence doctrine. Successful revolutions/regime changes
resulted in a shift in loyalty from one power to the other (e.g.,
Cuba, Iran 1953/1979, Chile, Vietnam). States were supported by
Russia, or the United States, based on a Cold War allegiance
structure so failed-state difficulties were restricted. Proxy wars over
spheres of influence and international treaties (e.g., the Warsaw
Pact, NATO) combined to ably adjudicate disputes and check
rogue actors. Domestically, the national security community under
the National Security Act of 1947' (NSA) was a relatively stable and
efficient structure; intelligence was divided between the FBI
(domestic) and the CIA (international) while military matters were
left to the Department of Defense (DoD).
III. 11/9: End of the Cold War paradigm-no more "patterns"
With the fall of the USSR as a super power on 11/9, rogue
actors or treacherous states could remain unchecked and secure
space for international perfidy. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact
resulted in a weakening of the International Treaty "board."
Commensurately, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
searched for a mission. The old trope for the role of NATO-to
"keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down' -no
longer seemed relevant. In the 1990s, NATO barely managed to
harness the strength to end the genocides in Bosnia and Kosovo
(and failed to act in numerous other arguably exigent cases).
While this operation took place under the NATO Treaty, bypassing
the United Nations, it edged the United States towards
unilateralism (away from collectivism) as a model for the way to
legitimize force in the international system.
1. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
2. DAVID REYNOLDS, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE 13 (quoting
Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General).
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Domestically in the United States, 11/9 led to calls for a "peace
dividend"3 and a reduction of intelligence/military spending. For
many, the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/9) meant the Cold War was
over. At the same time, the complexity and layering of world
politics increased due to the power vacuum created by the erosion
of the bipolar system featuring the United States versus the USSR.
Also, the United States' "pieces" on the military "board" changed:
The old national security structure system seemed to fit less and
less as we moved towards 9/11, away from 11/9. Al Qaeda's attacks
on the embassies in Africa highlighted not only a rise in terrorist
activity, but also flaws in the U.S. intelligence system; traditionally,
extraterritorial issues were the domain of the CIA (or military), yet
FBI agents were deployed to solve the "case." The nature of the
problem, the rigidity of bureaucratic interests coupled with a
waning political will, resulted in the hard questions and realities
about authority and structure remaining unaddressed. Less
prepared and more inclined to act quickly and reflexively, the
United States became increasingly vulnerable to attacks that could
be characterized as "empire baiting."
IV. 9/11 and the "War on Terrorism"
The 9/11 attacks violently changed the national security
reform political environment from gridlock to perceived need for
institutional changes. Political will led to critical reform initiatives
in the Intelligence Community (IC) and DoD. The Bush
administration eventually felt compelled to work with Congress and
make structural changes, but bureaucratic forces resistant to
centralized control were able to maintain power and influence.
Continuing control of budgets and authorities allowed the
traditional "cylinders of excellence" or "silos of power" to resist
centralized reform.
Rapid transitions are usually problematic. The military
exigencies of the post-9/11 world, combined with the technological
developments of the IT movement, necessitated rearmament and
reorganization of the armed forces. This trend, in tandem with the
more versatile military requirements of the post-i 1/9 world (where
3. See, e.g., Sanjeev Gupta et al., The Elusive Peace Dividend, INT'L MONETARY
FUND (Dec. 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/gupta
.htm.
4. See FBI Raids Nairobi Hotel over Bomb Attack on US Embassy, FIN. TIMES
MANDATE, Aug. 20, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 5351123.
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we have no peer military competitor), led to the military adopting
many different roles: peacekeeping, special ops, asymmetrical
warfare, nation building, intelligence gathering, etc.
The IC system, largely still a creature of the 1947 NSA,
remained a subject of ongoing reform, both ideologically and
mechanically. The old division of labor among the FBI, CIA (and
other civilian intelligence agencies), and DoD no longer seemed
fully applicable. The agencies continued to strive for a new
balance; the CIA underwent an increase in military-style operations
and has overlapped with the DoD. The military continued to
define "traditional military affairs" under its Title 10 and 1947 NSA
authorities. The FBI became more of a national security institution
and undertook a strategic shift toward an "intelligence-driven"
model (rather than simply using a law enforcement model), while
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) defined its new
appropriate role as head of the community.
V. Conclusion
For all these reasons, it would be inaccurate to characterize the
"legacy" of the 9/11 attacks as a static history question. After ten
years, we have yet to fully calibrate the IC and military to the new
dynamic environment of nonstate actors with multiple
geographical alliances exploiting regional conflicts. Moving
forward, we continue our adaptation initiatives while also
responding to concurrent challenges relating to rapid
technological development and economic difficulties. Our safety
depends on these ongoing adjustments in an increasingly resource-
constrained environment. We are moving in the right direction,
but there is more work to do and there are roles to be specified.
2. WHAT IMPACT WILL THE "ARAB SPRING" HAVE ON AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?
Historically, there are two dominant paths for the dissolution
of autocratic regimes:
PATH A: Post-defeat regimes, such as those of Germany and
Japan after World War II, emerged after a period of incubation of
democratic values and institution building premised on the view
that all peoples want democracy and liberty. Thus, rather than
being imposed, the desire for democracy is allowed to flower from
internal sources.
1590 [Vol. 38:5
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PATH B: Internal movements attack failed corrupt
governments, resulting in situations such as the 1848 Liberal
revolutions or the more recent East-European "color" revolutions.
In 1848, these disorganized protest movements produced
provisional governments that had no legitimacy with the masses,
failed to govern, and resulted in the reintroduction of semimilitary
autocratic regimes returning to power.
The impact of the "Arab Spring" on American national
security depends on whether the "Arab Spring" follows Path A or
Path B. We would like to encourage Path A, but this is largely a
domestic issue, and it is unclear how one pursues a policy to assist
this outcome without delegitimizing the forces we support. All
should feel good about the "Arab Spring" as a step in the right
direction; in the case of the 1848 revolutions, while some of the
monarchies interrupted by 1848 eventually regained power, they
were no longer able to rule with the same level of absolutism.
Analyzing the "Arab Spring," historian Eric Hobsbawm
hypothesizes that should the revolution fall short as in 1848, it
would not be because of the participants/ideology of the
movement, but rather its corruption by other forces -in this case,
by the forces of Islamism or a mass ideology divergent from that
animating the reform movement. It remains an open question
whether extreme Islamic forces will "hijack" the "Arab Spring"
movement or whether militaries will step in to shore up ineffective
governments.
The near-term future of these Arab countries will depend on
the primacy of certain values: liberty, democratic government, the
rule of law, containing corruption, and encouraging critical
institutional capacity building. If the "new" leaders can achieve
these goals, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya will be on the right
track. The stakes are high. However, as with 1848, it may be some
time before the ideals of the reform movement are fully recognized
and yield the results we hope for. The world is watching and
holding its collective breath.
5. See Andrew Whitehead, Eric Hobsbawm on 2011: 'It reminds me of 1848. . .,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011, 7:38 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
16217726.
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3. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE?
This is an ongoing case and therefore we will only comment in general
and not on the specifics of the case.
The facts of the case are that Warsame was captured overseas
in the Gulf Region, then held for several months on a ship and
6
interrogated for intelligence purposes. After he was read his
Miranda rights, which he waived, he spoke to law enforcement
agents. Finally, he was moved to the United States, where he will
face charges for (nine counts total):
1. Conspiracy to provide material support to a designated
terrorist organization (two counts);
2. Material support to a designated terrorist organization (two
counts);
3. Possession of firearms and destructive devices (two counts);
4. Conspiracy to teach and demonstrate the making of
explosives;
5. Conspiracy to receive military training from a designated
foreign terrorist organization; and
6. Receipt of military training from a designated terrorist
organization.
Warsame's transfer to the United States occurs against a
political backdrop of the National Defense Authorization Act of
2012,7 in which Congress took steps to prevent the transfer of
detainees (to the United States) from overseas and Guantanamo
Bay.
Over the last ten years, the left and the right of the political
spectrum have debated the best forum for the trials of terrorism
suspects-Article III courts or military commissions.
The tension of protecting classified information and sources
and methods has been brought to bear in these cases when the
government has to carry its burden of proof on essential elements
of association and material support. Article III courts have the
Classified Information Procedures Act" to handle such
6. Sealed Indictment, United States v. Warsame, No. 11-cr-559 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07
/Warsame-Indictment.pdf.
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
8. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006)
(concerning crimes and criminal procedures).
1592 [Vol. 38:5
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information.9 One twist of the military commission system is that in
order to establish jurisdiction in a military commission, the
government often has to establish that the individuals (1) engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, (2)
provided material support to hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners, or (3) participated in al Qaeda under the
statutes (this is not necessary in Article III trials).'o
These are very much conspiracy cases that involve a great deal
of nuance and supposition that are akin to, but not exactly aligned
with, conspiracy cases in the criminal context. The association
question as to how one becomes part of a "criminal enterprise"-
and what are the overt acts that are sufficient to establish
participation-can become a specialized skill of fact finding. How
one resigns from the group or activity also requires analysis of what
is an overt act that requires special definition.
These forums for trial-military and Article III-each will have
to make many different types of calibrations given the context of
the cases. Military commissions have been reformed and new rules
have been issued over the last ten years that have an important role
to play in the legitimization process in the struggle against
terrorism. Clearly, there will also be times when Article III courts
may be appropriate. The executive branch should have the power
to choose the appropriate instrument based.on the strategic goal of
demonstrating to the world that we have fair and just adjudicative
processes that follow the rule of law.
4. OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE
UNITED STATES LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE? WHERE IS THE UNITED
STATES MOST VULNERABLE TO ATTACK?
Three Points:
1. The great issue of the twenty-first century is the fusion of the IT
revolution and the information revolution, married to the rise of
the new powers and how these developments affect the three-level
chessboard of power-military, diplomatic, and economic. We
9. In the past couple of years, the commissions system has incorporated
similar procedures so that they, too, can handle classified information similarly to
Article III courts.
10. See Robert Chesney, Warsame and the Obstacles Associated with the Military
Commission Option in This Particular Instance, LAWFARE (July 6, 2011, 10:49 AM),
http://www.1awfareblog.com/2011/07/warsame-and-the-obstacles-associated-with-
the-military-commission-option-in-this-particular-instance.
2012] 1593
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have cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberwar. The Internet is
primarily owned by the private sector and it has become the
domain of commerce, communication, and war. The IT sectors of
most modern economies are the most dynamic. Our generation's
nuclear challenge is how to regulate cyberspace and to what
degree.
2. For many, it is unclear whether terrorism is an existential threat.
To quote Audrey Cronin:
Terrorism, like war, never ends; however, individual
terrorist campaigns and the groups that wage them always
do. A vague U.S. declaration of a war on terrorism has
brought with it a vague concept of the closing stages of al-
Qaida rather than a compelling road map for how it will
be reduced to the level of a minor threat.
3. The modern fear is the linkage between "cyber-" and terrorism.
Nonstate actors armed with state-of-the-art cyberweapons have the
potential to cause severe damage.
5. WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS
BEEN DEFEATED?
First, it is important we not view al Qaeda as monolithic,
exclusive, and unprecedented. As pointed out by Audrey Cronin,
while some of al Qaeda's tactics are new and innovative
(particularly its use of electronic media), viewing al Qaeda as
unprecedented and exclusive represents a compelling narrative,
creating an allure, which makes recruitment easier. While al
Qaeda boasts about its size and reach, this is in fact a weakness we
must exploit; al Qaeda incorporates many groups from many areas
under one narrative. These variant segments have different goals
and needs. We should divide and conquer-expose inconsistencies
and cut off pieces.
Regardless of whether al Qaeda may be different from terrorist
groups/campaigns in the past, according to Cronin we have
defeated such terrorist groups in the past via the following seven
methods:
1. Capture or killing of the leader;
2. Failure to transition to the next generation;
3. Achievement of the group's aims;
11. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How al-Qaida Ends, 31 INr'L SECURrTY 7, 48 (2006),
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/HowalQaidaEnds.pdf.
1594 [Vol. 38:5
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4. Transition to a legitimate political process;
5. Undermining of popular support;
6. Repression; and
7. Transition from terrorism to other forms of violence/illegal
activity.12
So how do we score our actions against these seven criteria?
1. Killing Bin Laden has clearly been a blow, but it will not mean
the immediate end of al Qaeda.
2. Al Qaeda has already successfully transitioned through several
generations. As long as a group has a pronounced ideology
and a fluid agenda, it can leverage world events for
recruitment. Can it become a "virtual caliphate?"
3-4. Al Qaeda's aims-the achievement of a pan-Islamic caliphate
(the deaths of all infidels, etc.)-are unattainable. Likewise, it
is hard to envision al Qaeda being merged into the political
process considering its goals. However, one area to stress is
that al Qaeda comprises groups from many different countries
with a vast array of aims and tactics; if we view al Qaeda as
monolithic, we lose the opportunity to use a wedge to pry off
pieces through negotiation.
5. Reducing al Qaeda's popular support is difficult.
Democratization will take decades. Rather, we would be best
served to capitalize on al Qaeda's mistakes by publicizing their
killings of innocent people-this is especially important
considering al Qaeda's innovative use of cyberspace for
recruitment. We can be more successful in this area.
6. Our effort to track and block terrorism-financing is an
important long-term arm in our fight against al Qaeda, but
only to a point; terrorist attacks are not that expensive: The
USS Cole attack cost $50,000, and the 9/11 attacks cost under
$500,000.
7. Al Qaeda already does this (e.g., with narcotics-trafficking in
Afghanistan). However, al Qaeda uses trafficking as a means
to fund their larger efforts ("narco-terrorism") rather than
seeking financial gain as an end unto itself.
CONCLUSION: DEFEATING AL QAEDA
In the end, success against al Qaeda requires smooth transition
from a large U.S. military to a spec-ops-based military with an "over
12. Id. at 17-18.
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the horizon" strike capacity, married to regional regimes that
possess legitimacy and share our core values. Defeating al Qaeda
depends in large part on the Arab Spring, expressed in greater
dimension; in the words of Cronin: "Al-Qaida will end when the
West removes itself from the heart of this fight, shores up
international norms against terrorism, undermines al-Qaida's ties
with its followers, and begins to exploit the movement's abundant
missteps."
13. Id. at 47.
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